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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Matthew Joseph Reed appeals from the judgment of the district court 
relinquishing jurisdiction after a period of retained jurisdiction.  On appeal, Reed argues 
the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction and abused its 
discretion when it imposed the initial sentence.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The police arrested Reed pursuant to an outstanding warrant.  (R., p. 15.)  During 
the search incident to arrest, the police found methamphetamine in Reed’s hat.  (Id.)  The 
state charged Reed with possession of a controlled substance: methamphetamine.  (R., pp. 
31-32.)  Reed pled guilty.  (R., p. 33.)   
At the sentencing hearing Reed argued for probation.  (5/24/16 Tr., p. 16, L. 18 – 
p. 19, L. 9.)  Reed informed the district court that he made contact with the Good 
Samaritan program and asked the court to include the program as a requirement of his 
probation.  (Id.) 
The district court had several questions regarding Reed’s lengthy criminal history 
as reported in his Presentence Report (“PSI”).  (5/24/16 Tr., p. 19, L. 24 – p. 25, L. 13.)  
Reed’s PSI indicated that he had been found guilty of the following charges: Minor in 
possession of alcohol (2002); Disorderly Conduct (2006); Battery (2006); a hit and run 
charge for which he was sentenced to two years in prison (2007); Obstruct Public Officer 
(2009); “CHRG 261, 5C PC” for which was sentence to 30 days in jail (2010); Battery: 




PSI, pp. 6-13.)  The PSI also reported that the following offenses had been charged, but 
their dispositions were unknown: Obstruct/Resisted Public Officer (2004); Sex with 
minor (2006); Oral Copulation with person under 16 (2006); Sexual Penetration with a 
Foreign Object (2006); Battery (2006); Probation Violation (2007); Probation Violation 
(2007); DUI Alcohol (2007); Sex with Minor (2007); Violation of Parole (2008); 
Violation of Parole (2008); Violation of Parole (2008); Violation of Parole (2008); 
Probation Violation (2009); Probation Violation (2009); False Info – Police (2010); Local 
Ordinance Violation (2010); Violation of Parole (2010); Sexual Intercourse with Minor 
under 18 (2010); Inflict Corporal Injury on Spouse (2012); Violation of Parole (2012); 
Violation of Parole (2012); Battery on Spouse (2012); Violation of Parole (2012); Inflict 
Corporal Injury on Spouse (2013); “CHRG 13700 PC” (2013); Inflict Corporal Injury on 
Spouse (2013).  In addition, the PSI noted several dismissals, including several charges of 
possession of a controlled substance, willful cruelty to child and sex with minors.  (See 
id.)   
The district court asked Reed about his criminal history and asked him about the 
cases for which the outcome was not listed on the PSI. (5/24/16 Tr., p. 19, L. 24 – p. 25, 
L. 13 (“Ordinarily I don’t put a whole of importance in things in a pre-sentence report’s 
prior criminal record reiteration that aren’t – where I don’t know the outcome...”).)  The 
district court asked about the background of some of these charges and information 
regarding the ultimate outcome of the charges.  (See id.)  The district court then asked 
Reed about the tattoo on his neck that reads, “Trust no bitch.”  (5/24/16 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 14-
22.)  The district court also inquired about Reed’s affiliation with the “White Boy Gang,” 




The district court then imposed a sentence “for possession of a controlled 
substance for events that happened February 2nd, 2016.”  (5/24/16 Tr., p. 26, L. 11 – p. 
28, L. 15.)  The district court imposed a sentence of seven years fixed with zero 
indeterminate.  (Id.)  The district court retained jurisdiction and recommended a 
“CAPP/CRP” rider to deal both with Reed’s addictions and his past violence.  (Id.)  The 
district court explained that it was “not overly optimistic about granting [Reed] probation 
sometime in the future” but stated it would consider doing so if Reed completed some 
specific tasks.  (Id.)  The district court advised Reed that, before it would consider 
probation, Reed would need to get a polygraph regarding his account of “his past sexual 
offenses and past violence towards women.”  (Id.)  If Reed got the polygraph and was 
able to get into the Good Samaritan program for 10 months, then the district court would 
consider him for probation.  (Id.)  Reed also needed to not have any disciplinary problems 
while he was on the rider.  (Id.)  However, the district court was not optimistic about 
Reed getting probation after the rider.  (Id.)  The district court was concerned about 
protecting the public because of Reed’s history.  (Id.)  The district court asked Reed if he 
had any questions, and Reed said that he did not.  (Id.)   
Reed had a number of informal sanctions while he was on his rider, but he did not 
have any formal sanctions.  (1/10/17 Tr., p. 31, Ls. 8-21.)  The parties agreed with the 
rider recommendation that Reed be placed on probation.  (1/10/17 Tr., p. 31, L. 8 – p. 33, 
L. 7.)  However, Reed had failed to get a polygraph and had failed to get into the Good 
Samaritan program.  (See 1/10/17 Tr., p. 33, L. 8 – p. 34, L. 22.)  Therefore, consistent 
with its comments at the sentencing hearing, the district court relinquished jurisdiction.  





seven years fixed to six years fixed and one year indeterminate.  (1/10/17 Tr., p. 33, L. 23 
– p. 34, L. 22.)   
Reed moved for re-disposition regarding the court’s decision to relinquish 
jurisdiction.  (R., pp. 45-46.)  Reed requested a “new jurisdictional review hearing so that 
the record can be made clear that Reed was asserting “his 5th Amendment right in regards 
to the Court’s request that [Reed] participate in a polygraph examination.”  (R., pp. 45-
46.)  Reed also timely appealed from the order relinquishing jurisdiction.  (R., pp. 49-52.)   
The district court held a hearing on the motion for re-disposition.  (R., p. 64.)  
During the hearing, Reed argued that he did not participate in a polygraph examination 
because he was asserting his Fifth Amendment rights.  (2/27/17 Tr., p. 3, L. 3 – p. 4, L. 
8.)  Reed argued that the assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights should not be the basis 
for a decision to relinquish jurisdiction.  (Id.)  Reed’s motion was based upon State v. 
Van Komen, 160 Idaho 534, 376 P.3d 738 (2010).  (See id.)  The district court re-read 
Van Komen and denied the motion because Reed’s case was distinguishable from Van 
Komen.  (2/27/17 Tr., p. 5, L. 20 – p. 8, L. 12.)  The district court also noted at no time 
prior to this hearing had Reed invoked his Fifth Amendment rights.  (See id.)  The district 
court also entered a written order denying the motion for re-disposition.  (R., pp. 72-73.)   
Reed filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35 on 
March 14, 2017.  (R., pp. 70-71.)  At the hearing on the motion for reconsideration, Reed 
testified that he did not get into the Good Samaritan program because he did not have the 
money and he had a “sex case” in his criminal history.  (5/1/17 Tr., p. 9, L. 18 – p. 10, L. 




The district court denied the motion for reconsideration.  (5/1/17 Tr., p. 16, L. 25 
– p. 20, L. 22.)  The district court stated that it had already reduced Reed’s sentence from 
seven years fixed to six years fixed and that Reed had failed to do the things necessary to 






Reed states the issues on appeal as: 
I. Did the district court abuse its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction and 
denying Mr. Reed’s motion for redisposition because Mr. Reed could not afford 
the Good Samaritan program and asserted his Fifth Amendment rights with 
respect to the polygraph?   
 
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion by sentencing Mr. Reed largely 
based on his alleged prior sex crimes, rather than the methamphetamine 
possession conviction at issue?  
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Reed failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it 
relinquished jurisdiction because Reed failed to meet the requirements necessary for 
probation? 
 
2. Has Reed failed to show the district abused its discretion when it 
considered Reed’s criminal history when it sentenced him? 










When the district court sentenced Reed and retained jurisdiction, the district court 
indicated that it was concerned about Reed’s history and was “not overly optimistic” 
about granting Reed probation after his rider but that it would consider probation if Reed 
completed some specific tasks, including taking a polygraph regarding some past offenses 
and getting into the Good Samaritan program.  (5/24/16 Tr., p. 26, L. 11 – p. 28, L. 15.)  
Reed failed to do either and the district court relinquished jurisdiction.  (See 1/10/17 Tr., 
p. 33, L. 8 – p. 34, L. 22.)   
Reed challenges the district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction, arguing the 
district court failed to exercise reason when it relinquished jurisdiction based in part on 
Reed’s failure to be admitting into the Good Samaritan program, despite Reed’s claimed 
inability to afford the program.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-12.)  He also argues the 
court violated his Fifth Amendment rights by relinquishing jurisdiction, in part, because 
Reed failed to take a polygraph regarding his past offenses.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 
13-16.)  Reed’s arguments fail.   
Application of the law to the facts of this case shows the district court neither 
abused its discretion nor violated Reed’s Fifth Amendment rights when it relinquished 
jurisdiction based on Reed’s failure to satisfy the requirements that he be admitted to the 





B. Standard Of Review 
 
A district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction is reviewed by the appellate 
court for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137, 30 P.3d 290, 292 
(2001) (citing State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981)).  To determine 
whether the district court abused its discretion, the appellate court examines “whether the 
district court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with relevant legal standards; and (3) reached 
its decision by an exercise of reason.”  State v. Flores, 162 Idaho 298, 396 P.3d 1180, 
1182 (2017) (citation omitted).   
“The requirements of the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions are questions of law, over 
which this Court has free review.”  State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 455, 348 P.3d 1, 70 
(2015) (quoting State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 598, 261 P.3d 853, 875 (2011)). 
 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Relinquished 
Jurisdiction Based, In Part, On Reed’s Failure To Be Admitted Into The Good 
Samaritan Program Because Reed Was A Danger To The Community  
 
At Reed’s sentencing, the district court imposed a sentence of seven years fixed 
with zero indeterminate, but retained jurisdiction.  (5/24/16 Tr., p. 26, L. 11 – p. 28, L. 
15.)  The district court was concerned about protecting the public because of Reed’s 
criminal history.  (Id.)  The district court indicated that it was “not overly optimistic” 
about granting Reed probation after his rider but stated it would consider probation if 
Reed completed some specific tasks, including getting into the Good Samaritan program, 
as suggested by Reed.  (Id.)  The district court asked Reed if he had any questions, and 




Reed had a number of informal sanctions while he was on his rider, but he did not 
have any formal sanctions.  (1/10/17 Tr., p. 31, Ls. 8-21.)  However, Reed had failed to 
get into the Good Samaritan program.  (See 1/10/17 Tr., p. 33, L. 8 – p. 34, L. 22.)  
Therefore, consistent with its comments at the sentencing hearing, the district court 
relinquished jurisdiction.  (Id.; R., pp. 47-48.) 
Reed argues the district court failed to reach its decision to relinquish jurisdiction 
by an exercise of reason because Reed told the court he could not afford the Good 
Samaritan program.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-12.)  Reed concedes that he may have 
been ineligible for the Good Samaritan program because he had a past conviction for a 
sex offense.  (See 5/1/17 Tr., p. 9, L. 15 – p. 10, L. 4; see also Appellant’s brief, p. 11, n. 
3.)  He contends, however, “[t]hat does not change the fact that, knowing what it knew at 
the time, the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 11, n. 3.) Reed has failed to show the district court abused its 
discretion.  
“The decision to relinquish jurisdiction or grant probation is committed to the 
district judge’s discretion.”  State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 143, 30 P.3d 293, 298 
(2001) (citing State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648, 962 P.2d 1026, 1032 (1998)).  The 
rider program’s recommendation are “purely advisory” and are not binding on the court’s 
decision.  Id.  (citing Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648, 962 P.2d at 1032).  A defendant has no 




See State v. Dabney, 159 Idaho 790, ___, 367 P.3d 185, 191-192 (2016)1; see also 
Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 142-143, 30 P.3d at 297-298.   
As outlined in the sentencing hearing, the district court had sufficient information 
and serious concerns regarding whether Reed was an appropriate candidate for probation.  
(See 5/24/16 Tr., p. 26, L. 11 – p. 28, L. 15.)  Reed suggested at sentencing that he may 
be able to get into the Good Samaritan program, and Reed asked the court that the Good 
Samaritan program be a condition of his probation.  (5/24/16 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 3-17 (“[S]o 
we’ll ask the Court to consider fashioning it so that should he be accepted into the Good 
Samaritan program, that be a requirement of his probation.”)  The district court 
determined that, given the nature and extent of Reed’s criminal record, Reed’s acceptance 
into that program would be a condition precedent to his placement on probation.  (5/24/16 
Tr., p. 18, Ls. 3-17, p. 26, L. 11 – p. 28, L. 9.)   
For apparently a number of reasons, Reed was unable to get accepted into that 
program.  Based upon Reed’s criminal record, and Reed’s inability to get into the 
necessary program, it was an exercise of reason for the district court to relinquish 
jurisdiction.  At the rider review hearing the district court recognized its discretion, acted 
within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with relevant legal standard, and 
                                                 
1 In a footnote Reed asserts that the holding in Dabney was “incorrect” and that his due 
process and equal protection rights were violated.  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 11, n. 2.)  
This issue was not raised below and is thus not preserved for appeal.  State v. Garcia-
Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, ___, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (citations omitted) (“Issues not 
raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal, and the parties will be held to 
the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court.”) Nor does Reed argue 
fundamental error on appeal regarding this issue.  See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 




reached its decision by an exercise of reason.  Reed has failed to show the district court 
abused its discretion.  
 
D. Reed Has Failed To Show The District Court Violated His Fifth Amendment 
Right Against Self-Incrimination When The District Court Relinquished 
Jurisdiction 
 
1. The Fifth Amendment Issue Was Raised Below And Is Preserved For 
Appeal   
 
Reed did not assert, or mention, his Fifth Amendment rights when the district 
court informed him that in order for the court to consider probation he had to take a 
polygraph regarding some of his past crimes.  (5/24/16 Tr., p. 19, L. 22 – p. 28, L. 15.)  
Nor did Reed assert his Fifth Amendment rights when the district court determined, 
during Reed’s rider review, that Reed failed to get the polygraph.  (1/10/17 Tr., p. 32, L. 
23 – p. 34, L. 25; see also R., pp. 72-73 (district court’s finding “that neither at the time 
of sentencing on May 24, 2016 or at the time of the jurisdictional review hearing on 
January 10, 2017, did the Defendant claim that the reason that he had failed to participate 
in the court ordered polygraph examination was due to an assertion of his 5th Amendment 
rights against self-incrimination.”).) 
Only after the district court relinquished jurisdiction, when Reed moved for a “re-
disposition,” did Reed reference his Fifth Amendment Rights.  (R., pp. 45-46; 2/27/17 
Tr., p. 5, Ls. 10-19.)  At that point the district court ruled that the decision to relinquish 
jurisdiction did not violate Reed’s Fifth Amendment rights.  (R., pp. 72-73; 2/27/17 Tr., 
p. 6, L. 2 – p. 8, L. 12.)  However, because the Fifth Amendment issue was raised below 
and there was an adverse ruling regarding that issue, which forms the basis for the 




v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138, ___ n.2, 395 P.3d 357, 361 n.2 (2017) (issue 
preserved for appeal so long as the relevant issue is raised before the district court); State 
v. Kelley, 161 Idaho 686, 689 n.1, 390 P.3d 412, 415 n.1 (2017) (citing State v. Fisher, 
123 Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d 942, 946 (1993) (“We will not review a trial court’s alleged 
error on appeal unless the record discloses an adverse ruling which forms the basis for the 
assignment of error.”)).   
 
2. The District Court Did Not Violate Reed’s Fifth Amendment Rights 
Because Requiring Reed To Take A Polygraph Regarding Previously 
Adjudicated Offenses Does Not Violate Reed’s Fifth Amendment Rights 
And His Refusal To Take The Polygraph Was Not The Sole Reason The 
District Court Relinquished Jurisdiction  
 
Reed argues that the district court’s indication that it would only consider 
probation if Reed took a polygraph regarding past sexual offenses and violence against 
women violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 13-16.)  Reed’s argument primarily rests on the holding in State v. Van Komen, 160 
Idaho 534, 376 P.3d 738 (2016).  (See id.)  Van Komen is distinguishable.   
The district court sentenced Van Komen for felony possession of marijuana with 
the intent to deliver and retained jurisdiction.  Van Komen, 160 Idaho at 536, 376 P.3d at 
740.  After the period of retained jurisdiction the district court held a rider review hearing.  
Id. at 536-537, 376 P.3d at 740-741.  The district court placed Van Komen on probation.  
Id.  Van Komen’s probation officer then filed a report alleging that Van Komen violated 
probation, in part, by having a romantic relationship with a 16-year-old-girl.  Id. at 537, 
376 P.3d at 741.  Van Komen admitted some of the probation violations, and the district 




ordered Van Komen to take a polygraph examination to determine whether he had used 
drugs or alcohol and whether he had engaged in sexual activity with the 16-year-old girl.  
Id.  At the next rider review hearing the district court inquired why Van Komen had not 
taken the polygraph examination and Van Komen indicated that he would invoke his 
Fifth Amendment rights.  Id.  The district court relinquished jurisdiction because Van 
Komen had not gotten the polygraph.  Id.   
On appeal Van Komen argued that the district court’s decision to not place him on 
probation because he refused to take a polygraph regarding his sexual relationship with a 
16-year-old girl violated his Fifth Amendment rights.  Id. at 538, 376 P.3d at 742.  The 
Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court could have “elected not to hold a rider 
review hearing for [Van Komen], and it could have elected to relinquish jurisdiction 
based upon [Van Komen’s] prior history and apparent attempt to communicate with the 
sixteen-year-old while on his rider.”  Id. at 540, 376 P.3d at 744.  However, the district 
court violated Van Komen’s Fifth Amendment rights because it relinquished jurisdiction 
“solely because [Van Komen] refused to waive his Fifth Amendment rights and answer 
questions that could incriminate him and result in new felony charges.”  Id. at 540, 376 
P.3d at 744.  Van Komen is distinguished from the present case for two reasons.   
First, unlike in Van Komen, the district court here did not relinquish jurisdiction 
“solely” for Reed’s failure to participate in the polygraph examination.  (1/10/17 Tr., p. 
32, L. 23 – p. 34, L. 25.)  The district court also relinquished jurisdiction based upon 
Reed’s failure to get into the required Good Samaritan program.  (See id.)  The district 
court made this explicit and distinguished Van Komen.  (2/27/17 Tr., p. 6, L. 2 – p. 8, L. 




to put Reed on probation – regardless of how he did on the rider – because of Reed’s 
criminal history.  (See 5/24/16 Tr., p. 19, L. 22 – p. 28, L. 15.)  As the Court in Van 
Komen acknowledged, the district court could have relinquished jurisdiction over Van 
Komen for any number of reasons, so long as the “sole” reasons was not based upon the 
refusal to take a polygraph that could expose him to additional criminal penalties.  Here, 
the district court’s decision was not based solely on Reed’s failure to get a polygraph.   
Second, unlike the polygraph in Van Komen, the polygraph ordered by the district 
court in this case did not infringe on Reed’s Fifth Amendment rights because Reed would 
not have been required to answer questions that posed a realistic threat of incrimination.  
A polygraph requirement is a lawful pre-condition of probation.  The Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution protects against compelled self-incrimination.  Estrada v. 
State, 143 Idaho 558, 563, 149 P.3d 833, 838 (2006).  However, as part of probation the 
state may validly demand “(1) answers to questions that pose no realistic threat of 
incrimination; and (2) incriminating answers so long as the State recognizes the 
statements will be unavailable in future criminal proceedings, such as through providing 
immunity.”  State v. Widmyer, 155 Idaho 442, 446-447, 313 P.3d 770, 774-775 (Ct. App. 
2013) (citations omitted).   
Here, the district court wanted Reed to take a polygraph regarding his “past sexual 
offenses” and “past violence towards women.”  (5/24/16 Tr., p. 26, L. 11 – p. 28, L. 9.)  
The district court was concerned about the previous charges for sex crimes and violence 
against women as set forth in Reed’s PSI.  (See 5/24/16 Tr., p. 19, L. 22 – p. 26, L. 7; 
PSI, pp. 6-13.)  Unlike the sexual contact in Van Komen, the subject of Reed’s polygraph 




dismissed.  (See id.)  Double jeopardy protections prevent statements made by Reed 
regarding past offenses from being used against him for those crimes that had already 
been adjudicated.  See Madison v. Craven, 144 Idaho 696, 701-702, 169 P.3d 284, 289-
290 (Ct. App. 2007) (Madison’s admissions, even if compelled, that he was sexually 
attracted to his daughter did not violate his Fifth Amendment Rights, because he had 
already been convicted of molesting his daughter).  In Van Komen, the polygraph 
examination was in reference to an uncharged crime, and thus Van Komen’s statements 
could be incriminating because they could be used to charge and prosecute that crime.  
Here, Reed’s crimes have already been adjudicated or dismissed.  (See PSI, pp. 6-13.)   
Even if some of Reed’s prior crimes were not fully adjudicated such that he was 
not entitled to double jeopardy protections, his Fifth Amendment rights still would not 
have been violated because he was not actually asked any questions that could implicate 
him.  See Widmyer, 155 Idaho at 447, 313 P.3d at 775.   
This case is analogous to Widmyer, supra, in which the Idaho Court of Appeals 
held that a district court can, as a condition of probation, require that the prospective 
probationer take a psychosexual evaluation, and if the prospective probationer rejects that 
condition the district court can impose an appropriate sentence.  See Widmyer, 155 Idaho 
at 447, 313 P.3d at 775.  In Widmyer, the district court explained that it would put 
Widmyer on probation if Widmyer agreed to participate in a psychosexual evaluation 
with a polygraph exam.  See id. at 445, 313 P.3d at 773.  Widmyer rejected the 
psychosexual evaluation, asserting his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.  Id.  The 
district court imposed sentence and Widmyer appealed.  See id.  The Idaho Court of 




violated because Widmyer was not actually asked any questions that would incriminate 
him and he rejected a lawful condition of probation.  See id. at 447, 313 P.3d at 775.   
If a defendant chooses to accept the terms of probation that may lead to 
incriminating questions, the defendant does not, by virtue of accepting the terms, 
waive the right to assert the Fifth Amendment when the questions are presented. 
Though a prospective probationer may choose to reject the psychosexual 
evaluation as a probationary term, rejecting the condition does not restrict a 
court’s discretion to then impose an appropriate sentence. 
 
Id. (internal citation omitted).   
The Court noted that prospective probationers often face the difficult decision of 
whether to accept the lawful conditions of probation.  Id. (citations omitted).  And while a 
prospective probationer may reject the psychosexual evaluation, such does not restrict a 
court’s discretion to impose an appropriate sentence.  Id.  (“Though a prospective 
probationer may choose to reject the psychosexual evaluation as a probationary term, 
rejecting the condition does not restrict a court’s discretion to then impose an appropriate 
sentence.”).   
Here, the district court explained that if it was going to put Reed on probation 
Reed would need to take a polygraph test.  (5/24/16 Tr., p. 26, L. 11 – p. 28, L. 9.)  Reed 
declined, based on what he later asserted was an assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights, 
before he was asked any incriminating questions.  Thus, like the court in Widmyer, the 
district court’s discretion here to execute Reed’s sentence was not restricted.  Reed has 





The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Considering Reed’s Criminal History 
When It Sentenced Him 
 
A. Introduction 
Contrary to Reed’s argument on appeal, the district court properly considered 
Reed’s criminal history when it sentenced Reed.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“Where a sentence is within statutory limits, it will not be reversed on appeal 
absent an abuse of the sentencing court’s discretion.”  State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 
229, 984 P.2d 716, 717 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 
P.2d 482, 490 (1992); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct.App.1982)). 
When examining a trial court’s exercise of discretion, an appellate court inquires 
whether: (1) the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) the court 
acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with the applicable 
legal standards; and (3) the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.  Id. 
(citations omitted).    
 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Properly Considered 
Reed’s History, Gang Affiliation And Substance Abuse Issues During Sentencing 
 
Reed’s sentence was within statutory limits, and on appeal, he does not argue 
otherwise.  When crafting his sentence, the district court considered a wide range of 
information including Reed’s criminal history, gang affiliation and substance abuse issues 
before it sentenced Reed.  (See 5/24/16 Tr., p. 19, L. 22 – p. 28, L. 15.)  “It is well 
established that a sentencing court may properly consider a wide range of information in 




P.2d at 717 (citing State v. Barnes, 121 Idaho 409, 411, 825 P.2d 506, 508 (Ct. App. 
1992); State v. Paz, 112 Idaho 407, 408-09, 732 P.2d 376, 377-378 (Ct. App. 1987)).  
“Thus, it is entirely appropriate for the court to consider a spectrum of evidence bearing 
upon the defendant’s character, including the defendant’s history of criminal offenses 
other than the one for which he appears at sentencing.”  Id. (citing State v. Couch, 103 
Idaho 496, 498, 650 P.2d 638, 640 (1982); Barnes, 121 Idaho at 411, 825 P.2d at 508).   
On appeal Reed argues the district court abused its discretion because he claims 
the district court sentenced him for prior offenses and allegations and not the present 
offense.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-182 (citing Findeisen, 133 Idaho at 229, 984 P.2d 
at 717).)  Unlike the district court in Findeisen, the district court here did not sentence 
Reed for a crime other than the one for which he was being punished.  Findeisen, 133 
Idaho at 230, 984 P.2d at 718.  The district court here properly considered Reed’s 
criminal history, gang affiliation and substance abuse issues when it originally sentenced 
him.  Reed’s PSI provided a long list of criminal offenses, many with the dispositions 
unknown.  (See PSI, pp. 6-13.)  The district court properly asked Reed several questions 
in an effort to clear up the dispositions and nature of the offenses listed.  (See 5/24/16 Tr., 
p. 19, L. 24 – p. 25, L. 13.)  The district court also asked about Reed’s gang affiliation: 
THE COURT:  What’s the White Boy Gang? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  What’s that? 
 
                                                 
2 On appeal Reed requests, that in the event the case is remanded for a new rider review, 
that his case be reassigned to a different judge.  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 18.)  While 
respondent is aware that was the remedy in Van Komen, here Reed has failed to cite to 
any authority or present any argument that his case should be reassigned to a different 




THE COURT:  Page 13, what’s the White Boy Gang?  You told the pre-sentence 
investigator that you were affiliated with the White Boy Gang. 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Oh, I was affiliated with – it was called Bad Boys on my 
neck. 
 
THE COURT:  What is it?   
 
THE DEFENDANT:  It’s just a white boy clique that we had – I had with in 
prison.  
 
(5/26/16 Tr., p. 25, L. 23 – p. 26, L. 7.)  The district court then expressed concern about 
Reed’s chemical dependency and Reed’s anger and crafted a rider placement 
recommendation based upon those factors.  (5/26/16 Tr., p. 26, L. 11 – p. 28, L. 15.)   
You need to know you’ve got 42 days from today’s date to appeal this decision.  
The reason for the sentence is your criminal record, and while I realize that there 
were dismissals on the sex crimes that I asked you about, I have severe concerns 
about your explanation given the fact that there are three different events over the 
course of four different years – five different years.  There’s violence to women 
on multiple occasions.  You’ve got a huge drug problem.  You’ve been to prison.  
You’ve joined a gang.   
 
I’m not overly optimistic about granting you probation sometime in the future, but 
those are the things you need to do.  You need to get anger treatment while you’re 
in the penitentiary, chemical dependency while in the penitentiary, come back 
with the polygraph, and commit to going to Good Samaritan for ten months.  If 
you’re a disciplinary problem in the penitentiary on a rider, I’ll impose sentence 
and I’ll do it telephonically.  I won’t even bring you back up here. 
  
(5/26/16 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 6-24.)  The district court properly considered the relevant 
sentencing factors and Reed’s history when it imposed the sentence for possession of 







The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.   
DATED this 11th day of January, 2018. 
 
            
      /s/ Ted S. Tollefson________________ 
     TED S. TOLLEFSON 
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